Supervised space robots are needed in space exploration by Erickson, Jon D.
AIAA-94-1280-CP
SUPERVISED SPACE ROBOTS ARE NEEDED IN SPACE EXPLORATION
Jon D. Erickson*
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
Abstract I. Introduction
Recent studies of the types, numbers, and
roles of robotic systems for use in human space
exploration, including the First Lunar Outpost
(FLO) mission, with a focus on planet surface
systems are summarized in this paper. These high
level systems engineering modeling and analysis
activities have supported trade studies and devel-
opment of preliminary requirements for intelligent
systems, including supervised autonomous robotic
systems. The analyses are summarized, results are
presented, and conclusions and recommendations
are made.
One conclusion is that space exploration will
be "enabled" by the use of supervised intelligent
systems on the planet surfaces. These intelligent
systems include capabilities for control and
monitoring of all elements, including supervised
autonomous robotic systems. With the proper
level of intelligent systems, the number and skills
of humans on the planet surface will be deter-
mined predominantly by surface science and
technology (not outpost) objectives and
requirements.
Space robotics, especially those systems being
developed to operate on planetary surfaces, can be
considered a form of the emerging technology of
field robotics on Earth. The solutions to the
problems we will be solving to make the explora-
tion of our solar system possible and practical will
apply to the many critical problems we have that
require operating in hazardous environments on
Earth and to improving human productivity in
many fields.
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Human space exploration is a strategy for
stimulating the United States, its people, and its
economy as much as it is a strategy for exploring
the Moon and Mars. A White House report 1 has
outlined various visions and architectures for this
crucial effort. We take the position in this paper
that the greatest benefit to the U.S. economy of
any space-exploration-related technology can
come from the development of supervised intelli-
gent systems, including supervised autonomous
robotic systems. Such systems are mandatory for
space exploration 2 to improve safety, reliability,
and productivity, while enabling large cost savings
through minimizing logistics 3. Such systems are
also needed in the U.S. economya, 5.
Intelligence isthe ability to acquire and apply
knowledge and skills to achieve stated goals in the
face of variations, difficulties, and complexities
imposed by a dynamic environment having signifi-
cant unpredictability. Intelligent systems are
composed of sensors for sensing the "world,"
effectors for acting on the world, and computer
hardware and hardware and software systems for
connecting the sensors and effectors in which a
part of the processing is symbolic (nonnumeric).
This processing enables practical reasoning and
behavior, which in humans we call intelligence.
Examples of artificial intelligence capabilities
in intelligent systems are knowledge based
systems, expert systems, natural language
understanding systems, robotic visual perception
systems, intelligent control and planning systems,
qualitative and model-based reasoning systems,
and supervised autonomous robots. Many supply
an explanation facility that enables the user to ask
what reasoning was used and why the conclusions
were reached. Intelligent systems can be of four
basic kinds: nonmobile, nonmanipulative systems
such as monitoring and control systems; nonmo-
bile, manipulative systems such as robot arms fixed
in place at the shoulder; mobile, nonmanipulative
systems such as inspection robots; and mobile,
manipulative systems such as mobile robots with
arms and end-effectors. While supercomputers,
distributed computers, or parallel computers are
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currently required to achieve real-time perfor-
mance with large scale intelligent systems, CPU
speeds double every 6 months, so such intelligent
systems will be easier and cheaper to achieve in the
future.
It is important to understand the advantages
intelligent systems have over conventional auto-
mation. Some advantages are given by Erickson 6,
which are primarily perception and flexibility in
dealing with uncertainty and dynamics imposed by
real environments.
The benefits of using intelligent systems in
space missions are improved and increased safety,
reliability, and productivity. These benefits are
derived from applying more knowledge and
reasoning in more flexible and appropriate ways
than conventional automation.
The EVA helper/retriever effort 7 is an initial
attempt to build and understand a limited version
of a supervised autonomous robot for use in space.
Many other efforts to build intelligent robotic
systems, not necessarily for space, are under way 8.
2. Space Exploration Studies
Recent studies 9 of the types, numbers, and
roles of robotic systems for use in the 20-year
Option 5A space exploration mission 10, with a
focus on planet surface systems, are summarized in
this section. These studies employed high level
systems engineering models that we developed.
We now employ a software modeling tool, the
mission simulation and analysis tool (MSAT) 11
which enables us to account for the nonlinear
effects of resource allocation, parallel support and
mission tasks, and occurrence of contingencies.
Mission feasibility is a paramount issue in
requirements generation (along with verification,
validation, and traceability). A useful device that
exercises the skill and judgment of those
concerned with requirements is to tell the story of
the mission.
These stories form the basis of input to MSAT.
Any mission story will be in the form of a process
description. At the requirements stage, the story
of any subprocess (such as landing on the surface,
unloading, etc.) will be in terms of objects specified
by functionality, not by actual design. As the stage
progresses toward design, the stories will involve
process designs and objects wherein performance
and operational parameters can be quantified.
With the process description format, each
mission story is told in terms of parallel processes,
each with prescribed start times. Each process has
a functionality type; at present the types used in
MSAT are the following:
• Mission backbone (e.g., landing, launch, site
preparation)
• Science
- EVA: geologic traverses, astrophysics,
geophysics
- IVA: lab experiments, life sciences, analysis,
packaging
• Maintenance
- Dusting
- Servicing
- Repair (EVA, IVA)
- Replacement
- Testing
- Inspection
• Logistics
• Support
- Power
- Thermal control
- Communications
- Crewsafety and well-being
Each process is broken down into subpro-
cesses, called stages, and each stage has a set of
options corresponding to the different ways in
which the stage can be carried out. Each stage
option has a model assigned that enables compu-
tation of elapsed time versus stage option name
and the types of agent resources to be used:
• EVA, IVA, and equipment
• EVA, robotics, and equipment
• IVA, robotics, and equipment
• EVA, IVA, robotics, and equipment
• Robotics only and equipment
MSAT is written in (interpreted) C, which is an
application running under the Ellery Open System
(EOS) 12 EOS is a development and run-time envi-
ronment for distributed computing applications.
MSAT is a relational, table- and model-driven simu-
lator that makes allowances for parallel processes
and dependencies, for supply and demand of
resources to accomplish processes, and for elapsed
time in accomplishing mission processes and tasks.
In constructing the Option 5A models, we first
reviewed the story of the mission from previous
accounts that tells what is intended to be done
during the mission with flight times, site layouts,
7O6
elementand system descriptions, and manifests.
Then we examined various advanced automation
and robotics issues raised by the story. After estab-
lishing two differing points of view, a conventional
systems view and an intelligent systems view
(causing changes in the equipment manifests and
in the way mission tasks are carried out), we rede-
scribe the missions from those points of view (see
Table 1) and construct two models corresponding
to these views for the purpose of obtaining
comparative results.
Numerical models were constructed only for
control and monitoring, unloading, site survey and
regolith handling, emplacement, servicing, and
maintenance.
primary crew time for creative activities of
exploration, science, and planetary resources use.
Science and engineering skills in the crew may now
replace some pilots and technicians. A supervised
autonomous outpost is thus seen as mandatory to
preserve small crew sizes and ambitious surface
mission objectives.
A broad range of robotic system uses in Earth
orbit or during space transport is indicated by
current studies. These include assembly of very
large spacecraft systems such as propulsion systems
and aerobraking structures 14. Maintenance of
onboard equipment in Earth orbit or during space
transport is another robotic system use being
studied.
Figure 1 shows results from modeling crew
workload demand for selected tasks versus crew
EVA availability under the conventional systems
model for four astronauts in 21 years of lunar
missions. As can be seen, either more capable
equipment, as in the intelligent systems model, or
more crewmembers are required. This mission
scenario, which calls for complex activities such as
offloading of large equipment and construction of
facilities in the absence of humans at the planet
surface site, clearly makes intelligent robots
mandatory. Figure 2 shows the crew EVA demand
under the intelligent systems model and shows
3. First Lunar Outpost Studies
Thissection is based on Erickson 15, which has
more details. The JSC Automation and Robotics
Division (A&RD) has been performing high level
systems engineering modeling and analysis
activities to support trade studies and systems
effectiveness analyses for proposed missions to the
Moon and Mars. Preliminary requirements for
intelligent systems, including supervised intelligent
robots, have been the focus of our efforts.
Table 1 - Conventional systems versus intelligent systems
• Use Fisher-Price 13recommendations
• Conventional software
- DDBMS for knowledge representation
- Normal sensors
• Mainly surface teleoperation, limited
telerobotics
• Rudimentary, mainly Earth-based DOKSS
• Ground-based control and monitoring (for
Moon)
• More-than-minimal computing power
• Predetermined procedures
• Limited surface diagnosis and repair
• Limited surface communication, major
downlink
• Crew used for outpost operations and
maintenance, science and technology
deployment
• Use Fisher-Price recommendations
• Intelligent system software
- State-of-affairs knowledge representation
- Extensive sensors/perception for knowledge
acquisition
- Abilityto use knowledge
• Supervised, autonomous robotics with structured
environments
• Distributed DOKSS, real time where needed
• Surface-based, built-in control and monitoring
with ground-based oversight
• Major computing power and information storage
on surface
• Adaptable procedures with built-in precautions
- Rehearsals
- Interelement and interface testing
Design for ease of testing, diagnosis, servicing,
maintenance, and repair
Major surface communication, major downlink
Crew used for science and technology, minimal
outpost operations and maintenance
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Figure 1 - EVA allocation for conventional systems approach.
Simulation is concerned with identifying and
solving problems by testing how well the opera-
tion of engineered designs will meet the mission
objectives. Simulation of operations can provide
early identification of performance problems of
integrated design and operations concepts. When
applied with alternative process and equipment
designs, simulation of operations is used to obtain
a less costly short cycle run-break-fix 16 approach
that can be iterated until simulations do not
"break" anymore. Specialty engineering analyses,
particularly reliability and maintainability, are
most effective when implemented early in the
design process when they can have the greatest
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impact on overall design decisions. The JSCA&RD
has developed MSAT for use in evaluating the fea-
sibility and effectiveness of proposed mission
concepts. We have also used a reliability and main-
tainability assessment tool (RMAT) developed by
the JSC Reliability and Maintainability
Division 17, 18 for SSF applications to esti mate the
amount of maintenance for the lunar surface
habitation element.
The FLO mission, while being significantly
more complex than any single Apollo flight, is
vastly less complex than the Option 5A mission
analyzed previously. Although there are periods
when humans are not present, no offloading of
equipment or construction of facilities is planned
when crew is not present. Maintenance of facili-
ties will still be required. We have continued to
perform mission simulation and analysis to support
system effectiveness studies of FLO and to under-
stand the requirements for intelligent systems
automation and robotics.
The FLO mission is envisioned as the first way-
point in expanding human presence in our solar
system. FLO is established by the successful landing
of an unoccupied human habitation element on
the lunar surface and a subsequent 42-day visit by
a crew of four that is transported to the lunar
surface in a separate crew lander. The crew will
arrive from 2 to 6 months after the cargo vehicle
with the habitation element has landed. The
habitat will be activated and checked out remotely
before crew departure from Earth and will be in a
ready state for crew arrival. Revisits to the outpost
are projected at intervals of about 6 months.
Humans are not present at the outpost during this
interval; however, the outpost must be maintained
sufficiently to allow reoccupancy.
During the 42-day (lunar day, night, day) FLO
first mission, the crew will
• Perform equipment checkout and maintenance.
• Unload and transfer equipment and supplies
between the crew lander and the habitat.
• Conduct local exploration and sample
collection.
• Deploy scientific instrumentation (e.g., for space
physics and astronomy).
• Deploy in situ resource utilization (ISRU)
demonstration equipment.
• Conduct engineering and operations tests (e.g.,
human and equipment tests under varying and
extreme thermal and illumination conditions).
Perform life science experiments and IVA
laboratory analyses.
_ i le_" nPerform crew se,f s_e, ance and operationa!
activities (e.g., housekeeping, training,
planning, eating, resting, public affairs
communications).
The habitation element provides all the
facilities and subsystems (e.g., environmental
control and life support, temperature and humid-
ity control, data management) required to sustain
the crew, except for food, personal items, and
logistics resupplies that are transferred from the
crew lander. The habitation element concept is an
adaptation of the SSF habitation module with
deployable solar panels, thermal radiator, and
high-gain antenna. An airlock is provided for crew
ingress and egress with provision for lunar dust
abatement. Regenerative fuel cells provide power
during the long lunar night.
3.1 Maintenance Simulation and Analysis
Maintenance has been investigated as a
critical issue of the FLO mission. As a critical issue,
maintenance or lack thereof impacts the
following:
• Safety and survivability
• Mission goals
• Levels of performance
• Logistics and spares (and related mass and
volume)
• Redundancies (and related mass and volume)
• Levelsof commonality
• Designs for maintenance and repair
• Designs for diagnosis
• Control, monitoring, and fault diagnosis
• Tools and equipment
• Sensing and sensors
• Crew availability
• Amount and types of robotics
• Cost
The requirement addressed in analysis to date
is to estimate the number of maintenance actions
to be required as a function of time in the mission
and the crew time required to accomplish the re-
quired maintenance. Thiswill allow usto address
the maintenance impact on the mission story as
implemented in MSAT and those results. In
?O9
addition, it will give early insight into the alter-
native options and im pacts to be considered.
A simulation tool for estimating maintenance
demand has been developed for the SSF program
and has been used for the FLO analysis reported
here. This simulation tool is RMAT developed by
the JSC Reliability and Maintainability Division and
Loral Space Information Systems. The following
discussion of this tool is paraphrased from
Blumentritt 17 and the Assembly and Maintenance
Implementation Definition Document 18.
RMAT is a stochastic, event-oriented simula-
tion process written in Fortran and implemented
on a personal computer. System maintenance is
simulated at the individual component replaceable
unit level of detail. Input to RMAT is a data base,
which for each replaceable unit contains reliability
data of the mean time between failure (MTBF),
equipment reliability class (i.e., electronic, elec-
trical, electromechanical, mechanical, structural,
and structural-mechanical), and the life limits.
Maintainability data includes the replaceable unit
location (internal or external), mean time to
replace (MTTR), mean time between preventive
maintenance (MTBPM), and the number of crew-
members required for the maintenance. Robotic
requirements can also be defined. Operations data
in the data base includes the manifest and
activation stages and the equipment duty cycles.
Factors that contribute to the generation of
maintenance actions are the following:
• Random failures based on a Iognormal
distribution of the MTBF
• Early failures that are time-varying multipliers of
the random failure rates and are based on a
history of experience of spaceflights and
satellites
• Preventive maintenance actions that are
scheduled actions
• Life limit failures that are beyond the length of
time of the current FLO study reported here
A Monte Carlo simulation approach is used to
estimate failures. The duty cycle is a part of this
calculation, as is a cold failure rate to account for
failure rate contributions when equipment is not
operating. K-factors 13 are applied as a fail u re rate
multiplier to account for maintenance actions that
occur for reasons other than the inherent compo-
nent failure rate. For the FLO study, we used the
default values that were developed by the SSF In-
Flight Maintenance Working G rou p 18.
Maintenance time consists of work site time
plus overhead time. Work site time is the time
required to remove and replace the line replace-
able unit (LRU) at the work site. Overhead time
includes the time to get the replacement part and
tools, travel to the work site, set up, close out the
work site, and return parts and tools. A Iognormal
distribution is used to simulate the variability in
the work site and overhead times. To estimate the
amount of crew time required, maintenance
actions are packaged into EVA and IVA crew shifts.
SSF definitions were used: one IVA shift is com-
posed of two crewmembers for 8 hr, each one
performing 4 hr of maintenance; one EVA is
composed of two crewmembers for 6 hr with 1 hr
of sortie overhead.
In order to utilize RMAT to predict mainte-
nance demands for FLO, a suitable reliability and
maintainability data base was required. Since FLO
was at the conceptual design stage, a representa-
tive data base was sufficient. The similarity of the
FLO habitat elements and subsystems to the SSF
habitation module and distributed subsystems
suggested that SSF component reliability data can
be used as a reasonable approximation for FLO
habitat component reliability data. The SSF pro-
gram developed a reliability and maintainability
data base of predicted values for its own mainte-
nance analyses 18. We utilized that data (circa
1991) to build the FLO data base where elements
were in "common" between FLO and SSF.
The mean work site time (MTTR) was
estimated for each LRU and recorded in the data
base. We used SSF times from the SSF data base,
and where items were added we made separate
estimates by comparison to SSF estimated times.
Overhead times can be input at the time of
execution of RMAT. We used 0.5 hr for IVA over-
head times. For EVA overhead times, we chose to
perform a parametric analysis and used overhead
times of 0.5 hr and 1.0 hr for each LRU. We view a
mean overhead of 1.0 hr as an optimistic goal for
FLO EVA maintenance actions.
3.1.1 Simulations and Results
Our approach to maintenance analysis is to
perform parametric simulations that will provide
answers (or insight into the answers) to key
questions such as the following:
• What isthe level of maintenance actions
indicated?
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• What is the crew demand time (work site plus
overhead) to perform these mai ntenance
actions?
• How many EVA and IVA shifts are required, and
do they fit within the preliminary allocation?
• How does the number of maintenance actions
vary when crew is present and is not present?
• What level of maintenance action backlogs
exists?
• What is the effect of delays in crew arrival from
2 through 6 months after the habitat has
landed?
• What isthe maintenance load for follow-on
outpost visits?
• What isthe impact of backlogged maintenance
on habitat functionality?
To answer these and other questions, we
formulated two basic maintenance scenarios:
(1) instantaneous replacement, which gives an
estimate of the maintenance load (a maximum)
required to maintain the habitat in a full-up
operational capacity and (2) scheduled resources
where maintenance is delayed until crew arrival,
which gives backlog estimates and functionality
impacts. Both scenarios assume 100 percent diag-
nosis of failures and no cascading failure effects.
For each of the two scenarios, we simulate 2-, 4-,
and 6-month delays of crew arrival. We estimate
EVA, IVA, and total maintenance actions and use
both 0.5 and 1.0 hr. for EVA maintenance action
overheads. For each scenario, we also simulate
two follow-up missions of 45 days at 6-month
intervals after each crew departure back to Earth.
For each simulation, 50 to 100 runs (more than
sufficient) are made by RMAT to calculate the
results.
We have also performed the simulations with
and without the early failure model to establish
the bounds on results. Although the early failure
model is considered to overestimate the number of
maintenance actions, it is considered the better
estimator for planning purposes.
Figure 3 shows the bounds on cumulative
maintenance actions with instantaneous
replacement for the two cases: (1) all maintenance
action (MA) types and (2) all MA types excluding
early failures. We also show these for the two duty
cycles- crew present and crew not present
(standby mode). The failure rate for the standby
duty cycle is 20 percent less than that for the duty
cycle when crew is present. For most of the
scenarios, however, the FLO is in standby mode for
a greater period of time than with crew present;
therefore, the cumulative error rate will be closer
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to the standby duty cycle plots. Separate EVA and
IVA results are estimated but are not shown here.
Table 2 gives the mean number of mainte-
nance actions for a variety of scenarios. The
numbers are not cumulative. For example, the
number of maintenance actions identified prior to
the crew landing on the lunar surface is listed in
the instantaneous replacement scenarios in the
"visit 1 before" column. The number of new
maintenance actions that arises while the crew is
present is listed in the "visit 1 crew" column. The
number of new maintenance actions that occurs
after the visit 1 crew has departed the lunar sur-
face until the time the second crew visits the lunar
surface is listed in the "visit 2 before" column. For
the scheduled resources scenarios, the "before"
columns show the number of maintenance actions
identified up to 2 weeks prior to the crew landing
on the lunar surface. We speculate that the crew
brings replacements for this set of maintenance
actions. From these numbers, the backlogs can be
calculated.
Table 3 gives the EVA and IVA requirements for
maintenance by crew based on maintenance
actions identified prior to crew departures from
Earth. This scenario corresponds to a logistics sup-
port of carrying spares for failures diagnosed up to
about 1 week prior to crew departure. Results are
shown for 2-month and 6-month delays and for
the first three visits to the outpost. Values given
are for the maintenance actions identified before
crew departure. The new maintenance actions
that occur after crew departure from Earth
through the time of return from the Moon are
backlogged until the following crew visit. (In the
2-month scenarios, the number of EVA and IVA
shifts backlogged to visit 2 exceeds the EVA's and
IVA's that are in the "visit 1" column.) In the sce-
narios that include all failure types, the number of
required EVA's exceeds the EVA allotment through
all three visits. IVA shifts required are within the
allotment for visit 1 but would exceed the same
allotment for visits 2 and 3.
Table 2 - Number of maintenance actions.
Model
scenario
Delay before
first crew visit
Visit 1
Crew
Visit 2
Crew
Visit 3
Before Before Before Crew
Instantaneous 2 months 42 56 127 36 99 31
replacement, 3 months 76 39 124 34 98 36
all MA types 4 months 96 40 118 43 89 31
6 months 136 52 113 26 85 33
Scheduled resources, 2 months 31 63 93 41 87 29
all MA types 6 months 111 46 106 32 82 20
Scheduled resources, 2 months 12 33 41 16 61 16
no early failures 6 months 49 18 62 15 61 17
Before
Crew
= Number prior to crew arrival, since last crew departure
= Additional number occurring during crew visit
Table 3 - Number of EVA and IVA shifts required to perform maintenance actions
identified prior to crew departure.
Model
scenario
Delay before
first crew visit
Scheduled resources, 2 months
all MA types 6 months
Scheduled resources, 2 months
no early failures 6 months
Visit 1
EVA IVA
5 3
10 10
3 1
5 5
Visit 2
EVA IVA
12 14
12 14
6 7
7 7
Visit 3
EVA IVA
10 12
9 11
6 7
7 8
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We have made a preliminary assessment of the •
functional impact each scenario has on the FLO
habitation element. Although RMAT has the
capability, our representative data base does not
include functional block diagrams or compre-
hensive criticality identifiers. Redundant LRU's
have shared duty cycles. The functional impact we
have examined, as output by RMAT, is on the set of
multiplexers/demultiplexers (MDM's). The MDM's
are of particular significance because they provide
the translation between the operative subsystems •
and the data management system for control and
monitoring. Additionally, they are of sufficient
number (31) to look at the results from a qualita-
tive point of view. Scenarios with instantaneous •
replacement have no functional impact. Both the
2-month and 6-month delay scenarios with sched-
uled resources and all failure types have similar,
and apparently significant, functional impacts.
Approximately 15 percent of the time fewer than
50 percent of the MDM's are operating; 70 percent
of the time fewer than 75 percent of the MDM's
are operating. For the 2-month and 6-month
scenarios with only random failures and preventive
maintenance, 25 to 30 percent of the time fewer •
than 75 percent of the MDM's are operating.
The following are observations from the results of
the simulations, including those discussed above.
Unless otherwise specified, the observations are
based on all MA types and for maintenance actions
only by crew, with backlogs of maintenance
actions not diagnosed prior to crew lander readi-
ness (spares loaded 2 weeks before crew landing
on the lunar surface).
The number of maintenance actions for visit 1 is
sizable, regardless of scenario, and ranges from
45 (2-month delay, scheduled resources, no early
failures) to 188 (6-month delay, all MA types,
instantaneous replacement). Furthermore, the
number of maintenance actions for instantane-
ous replacement and for scheduled replacement
is in the same ballpark; i.e., 98 versus 94 for first
visit, 2-month delay and 445 versus 397 for three
visits, 6-month delay (see Table 2).
Except for the first visit of the 2-month delay
scenario, the greatest demands for maintenance
actions occur while crew is not present (see
Table 2).
The crews will be faced with a sizable backlog of
(prediagnosed?) maintenance actions upon
arrival and will have to contend with significant
additional maintenance actions that occur after
their departures from Earth (see Table 2).
There are significantly fewer maintenance
actions for the first visit if the time delay be-
tween habitat landing and crew landing is
reduced (e.g., 94 for 2-month delay versus 157
for 6-month delay). But the number of these
maintenance actions that occurs after the crew
lander is ready for launch is greater for the re-
duced delay; e.g., 63 for 2-month delay versus
46 for 6-month delay (see Table 2).
For delays up through 6 months, the peak
number of maintenance actions occurs on the
second visit (see Table 2).
The number of IVA maintenance actions is
greater than the EVA maintenance actions by a
factor of 2 to 3 (interior LRU's outnumber exte-
rior LRU's by approximately 7 to 1). However,
the EVA total demand time (work site plus
overhead plus sortie time) will be similar to the
IVA total demand time for reasonable levels of
overhead times (0.5 hr IVA, 1.0 hr EVA).
Demand time is not shown here.
The allocation of 10 shifts for IVA maintenance
for the FLO first visit is sufficient to satisfy the
demand, except for the maintenance actions
arising after crew departure (6-month delay
scenario). Additional allocation of IVA shifts will
be required for visits 2 and 3 (see Table 3). (The
allocation may be sufficient, depending upon
further specifics of IVA definition.) All visits of
scenarios without early failures fall within the
allotment of 10 IVA shifts.
A FLO first visit allotment of four EVA's for
maintenance will not be sufficient; 5 to 10 EVA's
will be required plus whatever is required to
contend with the maintenance actions that will
be backlogged. An even larger number of EVA's
will be required on visits 2 and 3 because of the
backlogged maintenance actions from previous
visits (see Table 3).
3.1.2 Implications of Results
Implications derived from the simulations can
provide early insight into the FLO mission design
and the role of automation and robotics.
Significant implications for FLO include the
following:
• Science, exploration, and technology objectives
will be impacted unless maintenance demands
on the crew are minimized.
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• The indicated number of maintenance actions
will have a significant impact on logistics
resupply and resources (spare parts, EVA's, IVA
shifts, robots, data system, etc.).
• There will be significant impact to the function-
ality of the outpost if timely repairs are not
made.
• The number of new maintenance actions after
crew departure from Earth indicates special
attention to levels of redundancy and common-
ality to the lowest level is indicated.
• Timely, reliable diagnosis of failures will be
critical and must be designed for.
• The number of maintenance actions when the
crew is not present must give rise to serious
considerations for robotic repair capabilities.
• Design forease of maintenance and repairwill
be important in minimizing crew (or robotics)
maintenance demands.
• An onboard maintenance capability
(workstation, tools, equipment, etc.) is
indicated.
Several factors (sizable number of mainte-
nance actions, majority when crew is not present,
work site and overhead times, impacts on explora-
tion and science) indicate a real need for robotics.
Robotics are needed to
• Support diagnosis (test and inspection) for both
EVA and IVA.
• Assist the crew by transporting and positioning
parts, sensors, and tools and possibly positioning
the crew.
• Perform robotic maintenance to minimize
demands on crew, minimize backlogs of mainte-
nance between crew visits (some maintenance
will still require crew involvement), and free up
the crew for science and exploration activities.
• Perform dusting, servicing, etc.
In addition to the maintenance actions
described in this study, there will be other main-
tenance actions, including dusting of sensitive
surfaces and repairs to parts not characterized as
LRU's. These may be infrequent but time con-
suming. Maintenance of the rover, crew lander,
and scientific instruments will also be required.
The results presented here were the first
simulation results of the FLO mission and have
demonstrated the merit of early simulations to
evaluate mission feasibility. As the mission
definition changes because of these results and
other considerations, additional simulations
should be made. The iterations of simulations with
mission designs early in the mission definition
stages can be of significant impact in making the
mission feasible.
Requirements are characterized early when
they can have the most benefit at least cost. FLO
and all similar mission scenarios should adopt a
design for reliability and maintainability early in
the program. This design should include, as a
minimum, consideration of provisions for the
following:
• EVA and IVA repair robotics
• Full fault diagnosis, meaning design for
diagnosis
• Critical levels of redundancy
• Commonality to the lowest level of design
• Provisions for spares and logistics
• Design for ease of maintenance and repair
• Adequate sensing and testing equipment
• Tools and equipment for maintenance
• Maintenance workstations
• Crew availability and training
• A knowledge support system
4. Advanced Life Support System Robotics
Neither of the above studies explicitly
addressed the use of robotics to solve the problem
of excessive crew time being required to operate
various "subsystems," such as power, communi-
cations, thermal control, and life support for a
permanently manned outpost. We briefly address
life support here.
Since 1978 NASA has studied closed and
controlled ecological life support systems (CELSS)
or advanced life support systems (ALSS), which are
bioregenerative and based on a combination of
biological and physicochemical components that
may be used on future missions in low-Earth orbit,
in transit to other planetary bodies, and on lunar
and planetary surfaces. Higher plantswill be used
in food production, water purification, carbon
dioxide uptake, and oxygen release.
Agriculture can be very labor intensive or
assisted by automation (robotics). Operations of
an ALSS such as crop seeding, nutrient solution
maintenance, transplanting, plant observation,
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harvesting, edible biomass separation, transport-
ing, and preventative maintenance, if carried out
by intelligent robotic systems, could greatly reduce
the excessive crew time requirements to a reason-
able level. Ten crops are apparently needed to
supply nutrition needs. JSC is working toward a
year-long, high fidelity test in a Human Rated Test
Facility (HRTF) with four 90-day stays by a crew of
four aided by automation and robotics.
Experience from the Russian BIOS 3 experi-
ments 19 indicated an average of greater than 4 hr
per day for each crewmember was required to deal
with food production. Biosphere 2 results indicat-
ed an average between 2 and 3 hr per day for each
of eight crewmembers was required to operate the
food production aspects. Intelligent robotics can
be used to reduce these times to an acceptable
minimum for the HRTF20.
5. Usefulness of the Technoloqy on Earth
Space robotics, especially those systems being
developed to operate on planetary surfaces, can be
considered a form of the emerging technology of
field robotics on Earth. The solutions to the
problems we will be solving to make the explora-
tion of our solar system possible and practical will
apply to the many problems we have that require
operating in hazardous environments on Earth and
critically improving human productivity in many
fields. Service industries can also use these devel-
opments in relatively unstructured environments.
Compared to the applications of space
robotics in the Shuttle or on Space Station, the
supervised autonomous robotics needed to make
space exploration planet surface activities reliable
and productive are closer to the capabilities
required on Earth for many productivity improve-
ments that raise the standard of living for every-
one. The greatest benefit to the U.S. economy of
any space exploration related technology can
come from the development of supervised
autonomous systems 21.
6. Conclusions
Several conclusions are suggested by the
results presented in this paper. One is that space
exploration will be "enabled" by the use of su per-
vised intelligent systems on the planet surfaces,
incl udi ng supervised autonomous robotic systems.
With sufficient use of intelligent systems, the num-
ber and skills of humans on the planet surface will
be determined predominantly by surface explora-
tion, science, and local resource use (not outpost)
objectives and requirements. Several other uses of
intelligent systems in Earth orbit or during space
transport are indicated by current studies.
Additional modeling studies should be
carried out to provide further results and insight.
Our MSAT modeling tool makes these studies
easier to do relatively quickly.
Another conclusion is that more definitive
requirements definition studies should be carried
out for space exploration supervised intelligent
(autonomous) robotic systems.
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